Decentralization in Syria: Between Kurdish Aspirations and Regime Rejection

Syria is going through a critical phase in which regional and international transformations intersect with the complexities of the internal crisis, together shaping a new reality that casts its shadow over all components of the country — foremost among them, the Kurdish community. In this context, the demand for broad political or administrative decentralization stands out as a realistic solution persistently advocated by Kurdish forces, with the backing of influential international and regional actors, as a gateway to building a just Syrian state that embraces all its diverse communities.

The decline of Iranian influence in Syria — due to economic pressures, Western sanctions, and repeated Israeli airstrikes — has contributed to creating a relative power vacuum. This vacuum has given Kurdish forces greater room for political maneuvering and for consolidating their presence on the ground, following years of struggle against ISIS and Iran-backed militias. With the relative improvement of security conditions in northern and eastern Syria, discussions of implementing a decentralized administrative model have become more realistic than ever before.

Nevertheless, the rigid policies of the Syrian regime and its insistence on a centralized system of governance remain the biggest obstacles to any comprehensive political solution. The regime’s refusal to recognize political and administrative pluralism deepens the trust crisis and pushes Kurdish forces to seek international guarantees to safeguard their existence and achievements in any future settlement.

In this regard, the recent Qamishlo Conference was a pivotal milestone in the Kurdish political trajectory, showcasing an unprecedented level of consensus among Kurdish political forces around the demand for decentralization. This was supported by the active role of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which helped bridge differences. Additionally, French and American support for this approach has provided it with international legitimacy and strengthened its position in any future negotiations.

Adding to this is the crucial role played by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in combating terrorism, which has earned them international recognition and political weight, particularly from Washington and Paris. This operational and security role has given the Kurds a strong negotiating card, enabling them to present decentralization as a fundamental condition for any comprehensive political settlement.

Despite this momentum, challenges remain — chief among them is Turkey’s hardline stance rejecting any form of Kurdish empowerment in Syria on the grounds of national security threats. Furthermore, the absence of a clear international vision for Syria’s future and the inconsistency of international positions toward the regime pose additional hurdles to any political solution that secures the rights of all parties.

In conclusion, the demand for decentralization is no longer exclusive to the Kurds; it has become a political necessity to restore balance and build a new social contract in Syria. The traditional centralized state has proven its failure in managing diversity, and the country cannot be rebuilt without constitutional recognition of the rights of its various components. If Kurdish forces succeed in transforming their current unity into an effective negotiating strategy, supported by coordinated regional and international backing, a historic opportunity may arise to establish a fair decentralized system. However, if intransigence and lack of consensus persist, decentralization will remain a postponed project, entangled in the complexities of the regional landscape and the rigidity of the central authority.